THE OLIGARCHS WERE SANCTIONED. THEIR CHILDREN WERE RAISED IN THE WEST.

There is a question that European governments still do not like answering.

How did the children of Russia’s political and financial elite become so comfortable inside the very Western system that their parents’ regime spent years attacking?

The answer is uncomfortable.

Because for decades, Europe did not simply tolerate Russian oligarchic wealth.

Europe built an ecosystem around it.

London sold the property.

Banks managed the money.

Law firms structured the ownership.

Accountants created the architecture.

Universities educated the children.

Luxury companies sold the lifestyle.

The financial industry collected the fees.

And the political establishment largely treated the entire phenomenon as somebody else’s problem.

Then Russia invaded Ukraine.

Suddenly, the West discovered that some of the money it had welcomed for decades was not politically neutral.

That discovery came remarkably late.

POLINA KOVALEVA: £4.4 MILLION AT 21

Consider Polina Kovaleva, the stepdaughter of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

Her case became one of the symbols of the extraordinary lifestyle surrounding Russia’s ruling elite.

Kovaleva reportedly purchased a London property worth approximately £4.4 million when she was only 21.

Britain subsequently sanctioned her.

The important point is not simply the price of the property.

The important point is what the property represented:

the ability of a young member of Russia’s elite to enter one of the world’s most expensive real-estate markets.

London was not simply a foreign city.

It was part of the financial infrastructure surrounding the Russian elite.

And when the British government sanctioned Kovaleva, the message was clear:

Family relationships could become relevant when examining the financial networks surrounding sanctioned individuals.

ELIZAVETA PESKOVA: THE DAUGHTER OF THE KREMLIN’S VOICE

Then there is Elizaveta Peskova, daughter of Dmitry Peskov.

Her father is one of the most recognisable representatives of Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin.

The British sanctions documentation explicitly states that Elizaveta Peskova is closely associated with Dmitry Peskov because she is his daughter.

She was designated by Britain in March 2022 and remains on the UK’s sanctions framework. (GOV.UK⁠)

This case is politically fascinating.

Because it illustrates the extraordinary duality of the Russian elite.

One generation can operate at the centre of Putin’s political machine.

The next generation can build connections, education and a social existence in Western Europe.

That does not automatically mean that every child of an oligarch has committed a crime.

It means something more complicated.

The elite was transnational.

Its political power was Russian.

Its money was international.

Its children could be European.

Its assets could be offshore.

Its property could be in London.

And its social networks could stretch across half the continent.

THE SECOND GENERATION WAS NEVER REALLY “OUTSIDE” THE SYSTEM

This is where the Western narrative becomes uncomfortable.

For years, the children were often presented simply as young people living glamorous international lives.

Luxury holidays.

Fashion.

Universities.

London apartments.

Art.

Yachts.

Private events.

Instagram.

Influencer culture.

But there was a fundamental question nobody wanted to ask loudly enough:

Who financed the ecosystem?

Of course, being the child of a wealthy person is not itself evidence of wrongdoing.

But when the parent is a politically connected billionaire operating inside an authoritarian state, wealth cannot always be analysed as if it existed in a political vacuum.

That is the mistake Europe made.

It treated political wealth as private wealth.

VARVARA SKOCH AND THE FAMILY PROXY PROBLEM

The British government eventually became much more explicit.

Varvara Skoch, daughter of billionaire Andrei Skoch, was sanctioned by the UK alongside her father.

And the British government has specifically warned about family members and other proxies being used in structures designed to shield wealth from sanctions.

This is crucial.

Because once governments begin investigating who legally owns an asset and who actually controls or benefits from it, the picture changes dramatically.

The name on the document may not tell the whole story.

The beneficiary may be somewhere else.

The control may sit somewhere else.

The money may move through another company.

The family relationship can become part of the financial map.

That is precisely why modern sanctions enforcement increasingly focuses on beneficial ownership and control.

FELIX EVTUSHENKOV: WHEN OWNERSHIP MOVES

One of the most revealing cases cited by the British government concerns Felix Evtushenkov.

According to UK government material, Vladimir Evtushenkov transferred 10% of Sistema shares to his son Felix around the time of his designation, reducing Vladimir’s stake below 50%.

This is enormously important because it demonstrates the difference between:

owning wealth

and

controlling wealth.

A sanctions regime that looks only at the name written on a share register can be defeated if ownership structures change.

That is why family relationships matter to financial investigators.

Not because children are automatically responsible for their parents.

But because wealth can travel through families.

GULNARA KERIMOVA AND THE FRENCH VILLAS

Another case cited by British authorities is Gulnara Kerimova, daughter of billionaire Suleyman Kerimov.

The British government stated that she held four luxury villas in France on behalf of her father.

Again, the issue is not simply luxury.

It is ownership.

Control.

Beneficial interest.

Asset protection.

And the ability to place wealth in a jurisdiction where it is separated, at least formally, from the person who originally accumulated it.

This is the architecture that modern sanctions regimes are trying to dismantle.

LONDON: THE CITY THAT SOLD THE DREAM

Now we arrive at the uncomfortable part.

Why London?

Because London offered almost everything a global elite could want.

A sophisticated financial system.

Deep capital markets.

World-class property.

Prestigious universities.

Private schools.

Luxury services.

International lawyers.

Accountants.

Asset managers.

Art dealers.

Real-estate professionals.

A global network of connections.

And something else:

prestige.

For years, Russian wealth did not merely buy assets in London.

It bought access to a particular social world.

This is why the story cannot be reduced to “dirty Russian money.”

The real story is much larger.

There was a supply side and a demand side.

Russia supplied enormous pools of capital.

The West supplied the infrastructure to manage it.

Both sides benefited.

EUROPE DISCOVERED THE PROBLEM AFTER THE WAR BEGAN

Then came February 2022.

Russia invaded Ukraine.

And suddenly the Western political establishment began looking at Russian wealth through a completely different lens.

The houses were no longer just houses.

The companies were no longer just companies.

The yachts were no longer just yachts.

The trusts were no longer just trusts.

And the children were no longer simply wealthy international heirs.

The entire ecosystem suddenly acquired geopolitical significance.

Britain began freezing assets and expanding sanctions.

The UK sanctions regime remains active and continues to be updated in 2026; the government states that the UK Sanctions List is now the authoritative list for current designations. (GOV.UK⁠)

But sanctions are an admission of something else:

The system failed before the sanctions arrived.

THE WEST CONFUSED WEALTH WITH INNOCENCE

For too long, the Western financial system operated on a seductive assumption:

If the money arrives legally, it must be legitimate.

That assumption is dangerously simplistic.

Money can be legally transferred while the political system that produced the wealth is deeply corrupt.

An asset can be legally owned while its beneficial owner is hidden behind layers of companies.

A child can legally own property while investigators still need to determine the economic origin of the money.

A billionaire can legally invest abroad while remaining deeply connected to the political establishment that created his opportunities.

Legality matters.

But legality is not the same thing as political neutrality.

THE CHILDREN ARE NOT THE CRIME

This distinction matters.

We should not create a new form of collective guilt.

Being the son or daughter of an oligarch does not automatically make someone an oligarch.

Being wealthy does not automatically make someone corrupt.

Living in London does not make someone a Kremlin agent.

And appearing on social media does not prove sanctions evasion.

The argument is more sophisticated.

The question is whether family networks can become vehicles for preserving wealth, influence and access when sanctions target the original holder.

Western governments themselves have recognised that risk.

That is why family members appear in sanctions designations.

That is why beneficial ownership matters.

That is why asset-control structures are being scrutinised.

THE REAL FAILURE WAS WESTERN

And this is where I become deliberately uncomfortable.

Because the West loves to talk about Putin’s corruption.

It should.

But it should also examine its own role.

Who sold the London houses?

Who opened the accounts?

Who structured the trusts?

Who incorporated the companies?

Who advised the transactions?

Who educated the children?

Who sold the luxury goods?

Who took the commissions?

Who accepted the money?

The answer is not Moscow.

Much of the infrastructure was located in the West.

This does not make Western institutions responsible for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

But it does make them part of the story of how Russian elite wealth became normalised internationally.

SANCTIONS CAN FREEZE MONEY. THEY CANNOT ERASE ACCESS.

This is perhaps the most important point.

You can freeze a bank account.

You can freeze a mansion.

You can immobilise a yacht.

You can prohibit transactions.

You can impose a travel ban.

But you cannot easily freeze:

a university degree.

a friendship.

a business relationship.

a social network.

a reputation.

a passport.

twenty years of accumulated contacts.

That is why the second generation matters.

The most valuable inheritance may not be the money.

It may be the network.

THE OLIGARCHIC MODEL WAS ALWAYS GLOBAL

Putin’s Russia was never isolated from global capitalism.

Quite the opposite.

Its wealth moved through global markets.

Its billionaires purchased global assets.

Their children lived internationally.

Their businesses needed Western finance.

Their lifestyles depended on Western luxury industries.

The political system was Russian.

The economic ecosystem was global.

That contradiction allowed the system to survive for decades.

AND NOW EUROPE WANTS TO PRETEND IT DIDN’T KNOW

This is the part I find hardest to accept.

Europe cannot claim that everything became obvious only after February 2022.

The rise of Russian oligarchs was not a secret.

Their properties were not invisible.

Their yachts were not invisible.

Their political connections were not invisible.

Their families were not invisible.

Their money was not invisible.

The West chose to look at the money first and the political system second.

That was the mistake.

THE FINAL QUESTION

So, why could the children of Putin’s elite live like international influencers, students, entrepreneurs and socialites in Western Europe while their parents remained pillars of the Russian system?

Because the Russian elite understood something that Western governments were slow to understand:

wealth does not need to live in the same country as political power.

The money could move.

The children could move.

The companies could move.

The assets could move.

The influence could move.

The social networks could move.

And London, Paris, Monaco, Geneva and other Western centres were willing to provide the infrastructure.

Until the geopolitical cost became impossible to ignore.

EUROPE DIDN’T JUST ACCEPT RUSSIAN MONEY.

IT BUILT A BUSINESS AROUND IT.

That is the uncomfortable truth.

The children of the Russian elite did not need to choose between Moscow and the West.

For years, many could have both.

Russian political power at home.

Western education abroad.

Russian wealth.

Western property.

Russian connections.

Western prestige.

And when the system finally collapsed into sanctions, Europe discovered that the two worlds had become deeply intertwined.

The lesson is not that every wealthy Russian is guilty.

The lesson is not that every oligarch’s child is guilty.

The lesson is much more dangerous:

A financial system can become complicit in a political system without ever formally joining it.

That is what happened.

And if Europe does not understand that distinction, it will make the same mistake again — with Russia, with China, with the Gulf, with authoritarian capital anywhere in the world.

The question is no longer:

“Where did the oligarchs put their money?”

The question is:

“Why was the West so willing to receive it?”

That is the question Europe still owes us an answer to.

Roberto Balbino — CEO, Fintech SBB

Over 30 years of experience in finance, financial markets and international business.
Independent analyst of finance, economics, geopolitics and global markets.

Primary sources

UK Government — Russia sanctions and designated persons. (GOV.UK⁠)

UK Sanctions List — Elizaveta Peskova and Dmitry Peskov. (GOV.UK⁠)

UK Sanctions List — current search and ownership/control guidance. (UK Sanctions List Search⁠)