Who Arms the World?

There is a question that is rarely asked with sufficient precision:

Who actually supplies the weapons behind today’s major wars?

The political debate usually focuses on alliances, ideology and military strategy.

But there is another dimension that is far more concrete:

Who manufactures the weapons, who exports them, who imports them—and who ultimately controls the global arms supply chain?

The latest data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), covering 2021–2025, provide a revealing picture.

And the conclusion is difficult to ignore.

The United States dominates the global arms market

The United States is by far the world’s largest exporter of major conventional weapons.

Between 2021 and 2025, the US accounted for 42% of global arms exports.

France was second with 9.8%, Russia third with 6.8%, Germany fourth with 5.7% and China fifth with 5.6%.

Italy ranked sixth with 5.1%, followed by Israel with 4.4%. (SIPRI)

The gap between Washington and its competitors is extraordinary.

The United States alone exported more major arms than the next three countries combined.

And American exports increased by 27% compared with the previous five-year period.

This is not simply an industrial statistic.

It is a measure of geopolitical power.

The country that controls a large portion of the world’s advanced military supply chain also possesses enormous influence over the military capabilities of its allies and partners.

Israel: overwhelmingly dependent on US weapons

Israel has one of the most sophisticated domestic defence industries in the world.

It is also itself a major arms exporter: SIPRI ranks Israel as the world’s seventh-largest arms supplier, with 4.4% of global exports in 2021–25. (SIPRI)

But when we look at Israel’s imports, the picture changes dramatically.

The United States supplied 68% of Israel’s major arms imports during 2021–25.

Germany supplied another 31%.

Italy accounted for approximately 1.3%. (SIPRI)

In other words, virtually all of Israel’s major imported weapons came from just three countries.

The relationship with Washington is particularly significant.

SIPRI notes that Israel’s armed forces depend heavily on imported US equipment for several key capabilities. All of Israel’s active combat aircraft, for example, come from the United States. (SIPRI)

This creates a strategic relationship that goes well beyond diplomacy.

It is an industrial and technological relationship.

Ukraine: the world’s largest arms recipient

Ukraine represents the opposite side of the equation.

During 2021–25, Ukraine became the world’s largest recipient of major arms, receiving 9.7% of all global arms imports.

Its arms imports were approximately 100 times higher than during 2016–20.

At least 36 countries supplied Ukraine with major weapons during the period, mostly as military aid. (SIPRI)

The United States remains the central supplier.

But Ukraine’s supply network is considerably more diversified than Israel’s.

Germany has become a major supplier, while Poland and other European countries have played important roles.

The latest SIPRI data also show how deeply the war has transformed Europe’s military-industrial landscape.

European arms imports increased by 210% between 2016–20 and 2021–25.

Europe became the world’s largest importing region, accounting for 33% of global arms imports. (SIPRI)

This is one of the most important economic consequences of the war.

The conflict has not only increased military spending.

It has created an enormous new demand for weapons, ammunition, aircraft, air-defence systems and other military equipment.

And Russia?

Russia presents a fundamentally different case.

It is not primarily a major arms importer.

It is itself a major producer and exporter.

Russia remained the world’s third-largest arms exporter in 2021–25, although its position has weakened dramatically.

Russian arms exports fell by 64% compared with 2016–20.

Its share of global exports declined from 21% to only 6.8%. (SIPRI)

Three countries absorbed almost three quarters of Russian arms exports:

India — 48%
China — 13%
Belarus — 13%

The decline of Russian exports is strategically important.

It indicates that the war in Ukraine has not simply consumed Russian military resources.

It has also weakened Russia’s position in the international arms market.

Countries that historically depended on Russian weapons have increasingly explored alternative suppliers.

India, for example, has been diversifying its military procurement.

That creates another long-term consequence of the war:

Russia risks losing market share even beyond the battlefield.

The unexpected rise of Italy

Italy deserves particular attention.

Italian arms exports increased by 157% between 2016–20 and 2021–25.

That pushed Italy from tenth place to sixth place globally, with 5.1% of global arms exports. (SIPRI)

More than half of Italian arms exports—59%—went to the Middle East.

Another 16% went to Asia and Oceania and 13% to Europe. (SIPRI)

This is an important reminder that the European defence industry is not merely a secondary actor.

Europe is simultaneously:

● increasing its military imports;

● increasing its domestic production;

● expanding its arms exports.

The result is a rapidly growing European military-industrial ecosystem.

The real story is concentration

Look at the global numbers.

The top five arms exporters—the United States, France, Russia, Germany and China—accounted for approximately 70% of global major-arms exports in 2021–25. (SIPRI)

The United States alone accounted for 42%.

That means the global arms market is highly concentrated.

And this concentration has consequences.

Military alliances increasingly become economic relationships.

Weapons systems require:

● spare parts;

● maintenance;

● ammunition;

● software;

● upgrades;

● training;

● logistics;

● replacement equipment.

Buying a fighter aircraft is therefore not simply buying an aircraft.

It can mean entering a decades-long technological and industrial relationship with the supplier.

This is why arms exports can create geopolitical dependency.

The paradox of the modern arms market

There is an extraordinary paradox in today’s international system.

Countries increasingly talk about strategic autonomy.

Europe talks about defence autonomy.

India talks about diversification.

Middle Eastern countries seek multiple suppliers.

But the numbers tell another story.

European NATO members imported dramatically more weapons in 2021–25, and the United States supplied 58% of those imports. (SIPRI)

At the same time, European countries are trying to expand their own defence industries.

So Europe is simultaneously trying to become more independent while remaining heavily dependent on American military technology.

That contradiction will be one of the defining economic and strategic questions of the next decade.

Arms are also an economic business

There is another aspect that receives far less attention.

Wars destroy economic value.

But wars also generate enormous demand for military production.

Factories receive orders.

Defence companies expand production.

Governments replenish stockpiles.

Countries replace weapons transferred to allies.

New air-defence systems are ordered.

New aircraft are purchased.

Ammunition production increases.

The military-industrial cycle accelerates.

SIPRI reports that global transfers of major arms increased 9.2% between 2016–20 and 2021–25—the largest increase since 2011–15. (SIPRI)

Europe was the principal driver of this increase.

The war in Ukraine is therefore not only changing the geopolitical map.

It is restructuring the international defence market.

The uncomfortable question

The conventional political question is:

Who is right?

The economic question is different:

Who supplies the weapons?

And the strategic question is even more important:

Who becomes more powerful because other countries need those weapons?

The answer to the first question varies depending on the conflict.

But the answer to the second is remarkably clear.

The United States remains, by an enormous margin, the world’s dominant supplier of major conventional weapons.

It supplied 42% of global exports in 2021–25 and exported weapons to 99 countries.

It was among the top three suppliers for 76 countries. (SIPRI)

That gives Washington something that cannot be measured simply in dollars.

It gives the United States a network of military relationships extending across Europe, the Middle East, Asia and beyond.

The geopolitical map is also a supply-chain map

This may ultimately be the most important lesson.

The modern balance of power cannot be understood only by looking at armies, nuclear weapons or GDP.

We also need to look at:

who produces the weapons.

Who controls the technology?

Who supplies the aircraft?

Who provides the missiles?

Who manufactures the air-defence systems?

Who supplies the spare parts?

Who provides the software and upgrades?

And, perhaps most importantly:

Who can continue supplying them when a war lasts for years rather than months?

The answer to those questions increasingly determines military power.

And the latest SIPRI data show that, despite the rise of China, the rearmament of Europe and the emergence of new defence exporters, the United States remains at the centre of the global system.

The bottom line

The world’s arms market is not divided into two simple blocs.

It is a complex network of manufacturers, exporters, importers and strategic dependencies.

But one fact stands out:

The United States is still the world’s dominant arms supplier.

Israel depends overwhelmingly on American weapons for major imported systems.

Ukraine has become the world’s largest recipient of major arms, with the United States as its principal supplier within a much broader coalition.

Russia remains a major producer and exporter, but its international arms position has deteriorated sharply.

Europe is simultaneously becoming a larger arms importer and a more important arms producer and exporter.

And Italy has emerged as one of the world’s fastest-growing major arms exporters.

The wars of the 21st century are therefore also wars of industrial capacity.

Because in modern warfare, military power does not end when the ammunition is fired.

It depends on who can manufacture the next one.

Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025; SIPRI Arms Transfers Database; SIPRI Yearbook 2026. (SIPRI)

Note: SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database measures transfers of major conventional arms using a trend-indicator methodology (TIV). These figures should not be interpreted as the financial value of total arms trade, nor as a complete accounting of every military component, ammunition shipment or security transfer.

Roberto Balbino — CEO, Fintech SBB
Oltre 30 anni di esperienza nella finanza, nei mercati finanziari e nel business internazionale.
Analista indipendente di finanza, economia, geopolitica e mercati globali.