Why the Right Won in Chile and Colombia: An Economic Explanation Beyond Ideology

ENGLISH VERSION

Why did the political pendulum move to the right?

The victories of José Antonio Kast in Chile and Abelardo de la Espriella in Colombia are often interpreted through the traditional political vocabulary of left versus right, progressive versus conservative, or liberal versus nationalist.

That interpretation is incomplete.

There is a more interesting economic explanation.

In both countries, voters were not necessarily voting for a fully defined ideological project. A significant part of the electorate was voting against economic uncertainty, insecurity, weak expectations and the perception that government was becoming less capable of delivering tangible results.

The two cases are not identical. Chile is economically more stable and institutionally stronger than Colombia. Colombia also experienced important social improvements under Gustavo Petro. Yet both elections reveal a similar phenomenon: when expectations rise faster than economic reality, voters can rapidly abandon the political coalition that promised transformation.

Chile: the problem was less collapse than stagnation of expectations

José Antonio Kast won the December 2025 presidential election with approximately 58% of the vote, producing Chile’s sharpest political shift to the right in decades. His campaign combined security, immigration, economic growth and institutional stability. (Reuters⁠)

The interesting point is that Chile was not experiencing an economic catastrophe.

The OECD expected Chilean GDP growth of around 2.3% in 2025 and 2.1% in 2026. More recent data indicate that GDP actually grew around 2.5% in 2025, while inflation moved back toward the central bank’s target. Investment also recovered strongly, with gross fixed capital formation increasing by about 7% in 2025. (OECD⁠)

So why did the government associated with the Chilean left lose?

Because economic statistics and economic perceptions are not the same thing.

For many voters, the relevant comparison was not simply inflation or GDP growth. It was the difference between what had been promised and what households actually experienced.

The Boric government arrived with a transformative agenda: a new social model, constitutional reform, greater redistribution and a significant expansion of the role of the state.

The constitutional project failed twice.

The economy avoided collapse, but growth remained relatively modest compared with the expectations generated by the political transformation promised after the social unrest of 2019.

That created an important political asymmetry:

the costs of transformation were visible; its benefits were more difficult to identify.

This is a recurring political-economic mechanism.

When voters believe that change should produce a substantial improvement in their standard of living, a growth rate of 2–3% may be technically respectable but politically insufficient.

Colombia: a different economic equation

Colombia provides an even more interesting case.

Gustavo Petro’s government cannot simply be described as an economic failure.

Poverty declined significantly, employment remained relatively strong, and some social indicators improved. One analysis estimates that multidimensional poverty in rural Colombia fell from 27.3% in 2022 to 22.4% in 2025. (CEPR⁠)

GDP growth also recovered to approximately 2.6% in 2025.

But other variables moved in the opposite direction.

Inflation remained substantially above the central bank’s 3% target. The central bank projected inflation of around 6.3% for 2026, while fiscal pressures increased and private investment became a central concern. (banrep.gov.co⁠)

By the end of the Petro administration, Colombia was therefore facing a complicated combination:

social progress + fiscal deterioration + persistent inflation + political uncertainty + security deterioration.

That combination is particularly dangerous electorally.

A government can survive weak growth if people believe the direction is correct.

It can survive inflation if wages and employment compensate for it.

It can survive political conflict if institutions remain credible.

But when several uncertainties accumulate simultaneously, voters often begin to value predictability over transformation.

That is where the Colombian right found its opportunity.

The hidden economic variable: expectations

The most important variable in both elections may therefore not have been GDP.

It was expectations.

People do not vote on national accounts. They vote on their perception of the next two or three years.

Will my purchasing power improve?

Will I find a better job?

Will my business invest?

Will taxes increase?

Will the government control public spending?

Will my neighbourhood become safer?

Will the country remain attractive to investors?

These questions are economic even when they are expressed through political language.

And this is where the Chilean and Colombian elections converge.

The right successfully converted uncertainty into a political message:

The problem is not that society needs more transformation. The problem is that it needs order, investment, growth and predictability.

That message does not require every voter to become conservative.

It only requires voters to believe that the previous government was no longer capable of delivering what they considered essential.

A comparison with previous Latin American cycles

This phenomenon is not new.

Latin America has repeatedly demonstrated a pendulum effect.

When inequality, poverty and social exclusion become politically dominant, voters move toward the left.

When inflation, fiscal instability, crime, unemployment or economic uncertainty become dominant, voters often move back toward the right.

The important difference today is that the traditional left-right cycle is becoming faster.

Argentina is an obvious example. Javier Milei’s victory was built around economic frustration, inflation and the rejection of a political system perceived as incapable of restoring purchasing power and macroeconomic stability.

Chile followed a different path.

The country did not experience Argentine-style inflation or monetary collapse. Instead, the electorate became increasingly concerned with security, migration, economic dynamism and the effectiveness of government. Kast’s victory therefore represents less an economic revolt against crisis than a revolt against insufficient economic and institutional performance relative to expectations. (GIS Reports⁠)

Colombia sits somewhere between these models.

It did not experience macroeconomic collapse either.

Instead, voters faced a growing perception that the government was simultaneously trying to transform too many areas of the economy while struggling to maintain fiscal credibility, investment confidence and public security.

The election of Abelardo de la Espriella in 2026 was narrow, unlike Kast’s decisive victory. That distinction is extremely important.

Colombia did not produce a Chilean-style ideological realignment.

It produced a change of government under conditions of deep political and social polarization. De la Espriella defeated Iván Cepeda by roughly one percentage point. (El País⁠)

The paradox: the right now has to deliver the economic results it promised

This is perhaps the most important part of the story.

The electoral victory is easier than governing.

Kast promised growth, lower government spending, greater investment and security. Colombia’s new president has similarly promised aggressive economic measures, including substantial spending reductions and much faster growth. (AP News⁠)

But expectations can turn against the new governments just as quickly as they turned against the old ones.

A right-wing government cannot simply say:

“The previous government was the problem.”

It must demonstrate:

higher productivity, more investment, better employment, sustainable public finances and stronger real incomes.

If those results do not arrive, the political pendulum can move again.

This is the fundamental lesson of Latin American politics.

The electorate is increasingly less loyal to political ideologies and more sensitive to economic outcomes and expectations.

What should we expect?

Chile has a better starting position.

Its institutions remain relatively strong, inflation has been brought under control and investment has recovered. The principal challenge for Kast will be to convert political expectations into higher productivity and sustained growth without undermining fiscal stability or social cohesion. (ODI: Think change⁠)

Colombia is more difficult.

The new government inherits a much more fragile fiscal position, persistent inflation and a deeply polarized political environment. At the same time, the economy still possesses considerable potential in energy, mining, infrastructure, services and international trade.

The risk is that expectations have once again been set too high.

If the new governments deliver moderate but sustainable growth, the political shift could become structural.

If they promise 6–7% growth but deliver 2–3%, the same mechanism that defeated the left could eventually defeat the right.

The broader conclusion

The most interesting lesson from Chile and Colombia is therefore not that Latin America has suddenly become right-wing.

It is that economic patience has become shorter.

Voters increasingly tolerate neither permanent transformation without results nor economic liberalization without social improvements.

They want growth, security, purchasing power, employment and competent institutions.

Ideology still matters.

But increasingly, ideology appears to be the language through which voters express something more fundamental:

their expectations about the future.

The Chilean and Colombian elections should therefore not simply be read as victories of the right.

They should be read as votes for a different economic promise.

And that promise will now have to be tested by reality.

Roberto Balbino — CEO, Fintech SBB